In two experiments, we investigated the effects of prejudice (in the form of modern racism) and business justifications by authority figures (i.e., organizational superiors) to discriminate against minorities (Blacks in our research) in hiring situations.
As expected, business justifications by legitimate authority figures led to participants' obedience in the form of discrimination relative to a no-justification condition and, in the second experiment, also relative to a condition in which the business justification came from an illegitimate authority figure. Moreover, in both experiments, as expected, modern racism did not have a main effect on discrimination, but interacted with business justifications such that modern racism predicted discrimination when a legitimate authority figure provided a business-related justification for such discrimination but not in the absence of such a justification. These results are discussed in terms of their theoretical implications for understanding prejudice and obedience to authority in organizations and in terms of their practical implications for addressing the problem of discrimination in the workplace. ᭧ 2000 Academic Press
More than 30 years ago, Quinn, Tabor, and Gordon (1968) interviewed and surveyed 139 managers employed by large manufacturing companies located in the Cleveland-Akron area to answer the following question: "Under what conditions will a manager make a personnel decision which is nonability oriented?" (p. 4). These investigators observed that:
Among such nonability biased decisions are those which are colloquially called "discrimination"-decisions in which a candidate is denied managerial status because of such criteria as his race, national origin, or religion. The most realistically researchable "specific" issue of discrimination at executive levels is that of discrimination against Jews for management positions. Discrimination against Negroes for management positions is largely a hypothetical issue; managers are seldom confronted with Negro managerial candidates. (p. 4) Among the findings of Quinn et al.'s (1968) ground-breaking study of discrimination against Jews in the workplace were the following: Self-reported decisions to discriminate were related directly to the manager's exposure to organizational pressures to discriminate and the manager's anti-Semitic attitudes and were especially likely when an anti-Semitic manager was exposed to these organizational pressures. The sort of organizational pressures to discriminate that the researchers uncovered are depicted in quotes from two of their participants: "We definitely discriminate against colored people. It just wouldn't be practical to have colored salesmen. It wouldn't work from a customer's viewpoint, and so we can't do it" and Race and religion may come in because of the nature of the work, because of required customer prejudices which may influence our decisions. Our work is tailored to individual customers. Our men must work closely with them and so naturally we have to consider what their prejudices might be" (p. 39).
Times have changed. Discrimination against Blacks for management positions no longer "is largely a hypothetical issue." For example, in late 1992, Shoney's agreed to a $132.5 million settlement in response to charges the restaurant company discriminated against its Black employees. These charges included, for example, White managers being ordered to "lighten-up" their restaurants, a company euphemism for reducing the number of Black employees, and to hire "attractive White girls" instead (Watkins, 1993) . Indeed, only 1.8% of Shoney's restaurant managers were Black; and 75% of its Black restaurant employees held jobs in low paying, noncustomer contact positions (e.g., dishwasher). A former Shoney's vice-president stated these statistics were the result of the Chief Executive Officer's unwritten policy that "Blacks should not be employed in any position where they would be seen by customers" (Watkins, 1993, p. 424) . The Chief Executive Officer himself admitted, "In looking for anything to identify why is this unit under-performing, in some cases, I would probably have said this is a neighborhood of predominately White neighbors, and we have a considerable amount of Black employees and this might be a problem" (Watkins, 1993, p. 427) .
Times have also changed with respect to prejudice. That is, the nature of prejudice itself has changed from old-fashioned and blatant forms to today's modern, subtle, and rationalizable forms (e.g., Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995) . As we argue in the remainder of the Introduction, whereas Quinn et al. (1968) expected and observed a direct effect of prejudice (i.e., anti-Semitism) on discrimination, we anticipate no such finding. Rather, based on an integration of research on today's prejudice and obedience to authority (e.g., Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Milgram, 1974) , our expectation is that effects of prejudice on discrimination will be observed only when organizational pressures to discriminate (or what we call "business justifications to discriminate") are evident. We also argue that these business justifications, if delivered by legitimate authority figures, have direct effects on discrimination. Thus, what is to come departs from Quinn et al. theoretically; moreover, our research is concerned with discrimination against Blacks rather than Jews, with "modern racism" (e.g., McConahay, 1983 ) rather than "old-fashioned" anti-Semitism, and with methods intended to provide stronger causal inferences than did those used by Quinn et al.
PREJUDICE TODAY
Since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, attitudes toward Blacks among White Americans appear to have become more tolerant (e.g., Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Kryson, 1997; Smith & Sheatsley, 1984) . Indeed, it now seems that very few White Americans endorse derogatory statements about Blacks' innate intelligence or support the principle of racial segregation (e.g., Sniderman & Piazza, 1993) . This implies that "old-fashioned" racism, characterized by open bigotry and an emphasis on pre-Civil War beliefs about Blacks (Myrdal, 1944) , is dying in the United States. Numerous studies, however, suggest that old-fashioned racism has been transmuted to a more subtle, indirect, and rationalizable type of racial bigotry (e.g., Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1983; Frey & Gaertner, 1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Katz, 1981; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1983; Sears & Allen, 1984) . Although researchers differ in their precise definition of this new racism (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991; Kinder, 1986; Sears, 1988; Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick, 1991 ) the common essence of these varying approaches is captured in the work of McConahay and his associates on modern racism (McConahay, 1983; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981) .
Modern Racism
According to McConahay (1986) , "the principal tenets of modern racism are these: (1) Discrimination is a thing of the past because Blacks now have the freedom to compete in the marketplace and to enjoy those things they can afford. (2) Blacks are pushing too hard, too fast, and into places where they are not wanted. (3) These tactics and demands are unfair. (4) Therefore, recent gains are undeserved and the prestige granting institutions of society are giving Blacks more attention and the concomitant status than they deserve" (pp. 92-93) . In addition, McConahay (1986) described two other tenets of modern racism: (a) the first four tenets do not constitute racism because they are empirical facts and (b) racism is bad. Consequently, "those endorsing the ideology of modern racism do not define their own beliefs and attitudes as racist" (p. 93) and they act in ways to protect a nonprejudiced, nondiscriminatory selfimage. Thus, for the modern racist to behave consistent with his/her negative racial attitudes requires that he/she be imbedded in "a context in which there is a plausible, nonprejudiced explanation available for what might be considered prejudiced behavior . . ." (p. 100).
In past research, the plausible, nonprejudiced explanations used to free the modern racist to act on his/her negative attitudes, consistent with extant theorizing, have been designed to enhance the saliency and potency of nonracial factors that would justify unfavorable responding regardless of the race of the target person (see, for example, Gaertner, 1976, and Gaertner & Dovidio, 1981) . In the section that follows, we argue that the justifications necessary for modern racists to act out their attitudes also can be explicitly racial in nature, as long as they appear to be nonprejudicially motivated.
Modern Racism and Business Justifications
Recall the story of Shoney's and, in particular, the statement of the company's Chief Executive Officer. In essence, he asserted a restaurant unit's performance might be affected positively if the racial make-up of the unit's customer-contact personnel matched that of the customer population. Thus, a unit serving a White customer population should employ, according to the business reasoning of the Chief Executive Officer, White customer-contact personnel. Reasoning from a bottom-line business perspective, the Chief Executive Officer's assertion may be seen as plausible and nonprejudicial. That is, a businessperson might see the assertion as capturing a sound management practice (i.e., matching the characteristics of customers and those who serve them) and not as a reflection of racial prejudice (Brief, 1998) . We contend that such justifications often are evident in business organizations and other social contexts [also see the previous quotes of two of the participants in Quinn et al.'s (1968) research]. Indeed, the "matching assertion" even is common among those who advocate racially integrated organizations (Cox, 1993) . The President of Avon Corporation, for example, concluded his company's inner-city markets became significantly more profitable when additional Black and Latino personnel were placed in them (Cox & Blake, 1991) . This was so, according to the President, because these newly placed personnel were uniquely qualified to understand certain aspects of the worldview of the minority populations in the inner cities.
Here, the "truth-value" of justifications entailing assertions like the matching one is not germane to our argument. What is important is that justifications for discrimination such as the one given by Shoney's Chief Executive Officer may be commonplace and seen by those to whom they are directed as plausible and nonprejudiced, even though they are explicitly racial in nature. In line with the tenets of modern racism (e.g., McConahay, 1986) , we expect these business justifications for excluding Blacks to free modern racists to act on their negative racial attitudes. Thus, when the justifications are available, modern racist attitudes should predict discrimination. But, when no such justifications are available, modern racism is not expected to affect discrimination. Assuming our expectations are supported empirically, the literature on modern racism would have been advanced considerably by incorporating the idea that the plausible, nonprejudiced explanations necessary to free those harboring negative racial attitudes to act can entail commonplace, race-based arguments. This idea loosens substantially the psychological constraints placed on modern racists and, therefore, would contribute to our understanding of the prevalence of racial discrimination in employment settings.
OBEDIENCE TO LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY
Returning once again to the case of Shoney's, the business justification to discriminate against Blacks came from a legitimate authority figure, indeed, from the firm's Chief Executive Officer. Psychologically, therefore, the justification likely served a function in addition to freeing modern racists to act. Specifically, as argued below, such justifications from legitimate authority figures are expected to produce obedience in the form of discriminatory behaviors independent of the recipient's racial attitudes; that is, the justifications are received by subordinates as instructions from above to be followed. If this is correct, then lower level organizational members can be seen as complying with the wishes of their superiors, even though these wishes may be inconsistent with the lower level members' personal values and may entail committing immoral or illegal acts. This depiction of lower level organizational members questions the North American notion of individuals as free moral agents (e.g., Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997; Menon, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 1999) , acting on what they consider to be the right thing to do. Simon (1976) defined authority as "the power to make decisions that guide the actions of others" (p. 125), and he asserted that, in authority relationships in organizations, the subordinate "holds in abeyance his own critical facilities for choosing between alternatives and uses the formal criterion of the receipt 77 of a command or a signal as his basis for choice" (p. 126). Subordinates do so because authority entails "the right to command others . . ." (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989, p. 53) . In organizations, this "right" denotes the legitimacy stemming from the system of hierarchical role relations (Weber, 1947) . This system serves as a primary mechanism for reducing the variance in the behavior of individuals and coordinating them toward organizational ends (Katz & Kahn, 1978) .
Authority relationships in organizations, as we have suggested, also may have a potential "dark side." This can take the form of subordinate compliance to directives from above that are illegal or unethical. The disturbing extent to which such compliance can occur is revealed by the Holocaust and the My Lai massacre. Researchers studying these horrific acts of compliance have termed them crimes of obedience (Hamilton & Sanders, 1992; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989) , emphasizing the point that they are "organizational pathologies" (Darley, 1992) . Similar compliance effects were demonstrated by Milgram (1974) in his classic experiments. Milgram's participants were willing to deliver what they thought were extremely strong electrical shocks to another person when instructed to do so by an experimenter, even when the other person (a confederate) shouted in pain and complained of a heart condition.
Explanations for such horrific compliance behaviors vary, but most research points to contextual factors that lead persons in subordinate positions not to "see the situation as one of choice, but of role requirements and obligations" (Hamilton & Sanders, 1992, p. 49 ). This perspective is consistent with the views of Simon (1976) , who states that "personal considerations determine whether a person will participate [in an organization], but if he decides to participate, they will not determine the content of his organizational behavior" (p. 203). Instead, he asserts employees essentially sign a "blank check" upon joining an organization.
The implication of the above is that the subordinate in a hierarchical relationship is primarily oriented toward fulfilling his or her role obligations, not with the content of his or her specific duties. Milgram (1974) posited that in his studies, a participant "entrust[s] the broader tasks of setting goals and assessing morality to the experimental authority he is serving" (p. 7). In doing so, the participant "divests himself of responsibility by attributing all initiative to the experimenter, a legitimate authority" (p. 8); thus, the "individual no longer views himself as responsible for his own actions but defines himself as an instrument for carrying out the wishes of others" (p. 134). The implications of this reasoning for the problem at hand, employment discrimination, are evident. Following the lead of Brief, Buttram, Elliott, Reizenstein, and McCline (1995; also see Petersen & Dietz, in press), we expect that subordinates will discriminate against Black job applicants when provided with instructions (in the form of a justification) from their organizational superiors to do so. These investigators, in fact, observed such an effect among their participants whose responses were obtained during an "in-basket exercise." If this finding were to be replicated, then a source of discrimination, perhaps more potent than racial attitudes, would have been verified. This is so because business justifications to discriminate are seen as affecting behavior, independent of one's racial attitudes.
Legitimacy
It should be clear that when we proposed that subordinates would comply with instructions to discriminate on the basis of race, it was assumed the authority figure issuing the directive would be perceived by the subordinates as legitimate. But, the idea that legitimacy is a necessary condition for compliance in organizations has yet to be assessed directly, and, as we show, such an assessment is of theoretical interest. The closest empirical evidence pertaining to the question of legitimacy was produced by Milgram (1974) from his "ordinary man" experiment. In this study, a person who appeared to be a participant was placed in the position of ordering an actual participant to deliver shocks to a third party. Only a third as many participants followed the instructions of the "ordinary man" as heeded the orders when issued by the experimenter himself.
In fact, not all persons occupying hierarchial positions of authority are perceived as legitimate. Kelman and Hamilton (1989) offered examples. The authority figure "may be oppressive and unrepresentative and hence considered illegitimate; or the . . . leaders may have gained power through fraudulent or violent means" (p. 56). What if the superior issuing the order to discriminate, in fact, is not perceived as legitimate? We would expect subordinates not to comply, not to discriminate against Black applicants. More specifically, given two authority figures-one legitimate, the other not-we would expect the former's instructions to be complied with (i.e., to promote racial discrimination in our research) and the latter's to have no effect.
Consistent with our previous analysis of modern racism, we also expect that these negative attitudes will be more positively related to the discriminatory behaviors of subordinates when they receive instructions from a legitimate rather than an illegitimate source. We are asserting that a business justification to discriminate from an illegitimate source does not constitute the plausible, nonprejudiced explanation necessary to free modern racists to act on their negative racial attitudes. This is so simply because, according to Hovland and Weiss (1951) , an illegitimate authority figure lacks credibility.
Summary
We have argued that subordinates harboring modern racist attitudes are released to discriminate against Black job applicants when their superiors provide them with a business justification to hire the "right type of person" (i.e., a White). We also have asserted that such justifications (i.e., instructions) from above have a main effect on discriminatory behavior. Finally, we argued that the effect of these instructions is dependent upon them being issued by a source that subordinates perceive as legitimate. Reported below are two studies designed to assess the veracity of the above assertions.
STUDY 1
Study 1 was designed to test the following two hypotheses: (1) subordinates given a business justification by a legitimate authority figure to discriminate against Black job applicants do so, and (2) subordinates' modern racist attitudes affect discrimination against Black applicants in the presence of a business justification from a legitimate authority figure to do so, but not in the absence of such a justification.
Importantly, consistent with current theories (e.g., McConahay, 1986) , no main effect for modern racism is predicted.
Method

Participants
Participants, who received course credit for their participation, were 84 undergraduates (45 males and 39 females) enrolled in an introductory psychology course at a private university in the south-central United States. All participants were White.
Procedure
Stage 1: preexperimental test. Introductory psychology students participated in a mass testing procedure at the beginning of the semester. The Modern Racism Scale (MRS) (McConahay et al., 1981) was included in this mass testing along with numerous research instruments. The MRS asks respondents to agree or disagree with a set of beliefs about Blacks and is described in detail below.
Stage 2: the experiment. Later in the semester, participants in the mass testing were asked to participate in an experiment that involved assisting a doctoral student in assessing the quality of a new job applicant rating form for an organization.
The participants, who were run individually, were told they would go through an actual applicant screening process and be asked to rate 10 applicants from whom they would be choosing three candidates who were to be interviewed for a marketing representative position. The experimenter, who was blind to both condition and participants' scores on the MRS, then distributed a packet to the participants containing summary descriptions of the applicants, a letter from the President of the client firm, and 10 applicant rating forms. The 10 applicant summaries in the packet described three qualified Black applicants, two qualified White applicants, and five unqualified White applicants. Participants were assigned randomly to either a no-justification condition or a business-justification condition prior to their arrival at the experiment. The nojustification condition contained no instructions from the President of the client firm regarding the selection of applicants based on race. In the business-justification condition, participants were told the following in a memorandum from the President of the client firm:
In the past, we have kept our [marketing] teams as homogeneous as possible. We feel that similar people will have similar goals and ideas. Importantly, the particular team to which [the new marketing representative] will be assigned currently includes no minority group members. Our organization attempts to match the characteristics of our representatives with the characteristics of the population to which they will be assigned. The particular territory to which your selected representative will be assigned contains relatively few minority group members. Therefore, in this particular situation, I feel that it is important that you do not hire anyone that is a member of a minority group.
After completing the rating forms and making their selections, participants completed a short questionnaire concerning how they felt about the screening process. Upon completion of all materials, participants were debriefed.
Measures
Modern racism. The Modern Racism Scale (MRS) (McConahay et al., 1981) was used to assess participants' levels of prejudice. The MRS was designed to be relatively nonreactive because it does not blatantly try to appraise racial attitudes. For example, the following reverse scored item is one of seven comprising the MRS: "It is easy to understand the anger of Black people in America." Another item in the MRS reads "Discrimination against Blacks is no longer a problem in the United States." Participants were asked to indicate their agreement with each of the items on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 ("Strongly Disagree") to 5 ("Strongly Agree"), with higher scores indicating a more modern racist attitude. Moreover, the racial items were embedded with 20 other questions related to other current issues (e.g., homosexuality and abortion).
In previous college student samples, coefficient alpha for the MRS ranged from .86 to .91 (McConahay, 1983 ). In the current sample, it was .86. The MRS mean was 16.32 (SD ϭ 6.38) and the median was 15.50, with scores ranging from 7 to 32.
Dependent measure. The dependent variable was the number of Black applicants selected for a job interview. This variable assumed a value from 0 (no Black applicants selected) to 3, with 0 representing the greatest amount of discrimination. On average, the participants selected 1.36 Black applicants. None of the participants selected more than 2 Black applicants.
The applicant summaries included job-relevant information on education and work experience. A priori, the qualifications, as described below, were manipulated to be higher for five of the applicants than for the remaining five applicants. All applicants, for whom gender was held constant (male), had advanced degrees (MBAs) and at least 6 years of work experience. Whereas the five qualified applicants, however, had at least 9 years of professional experience in marketing and MBAs with a concentration in marketing, the five unqualified applicants did not have more than 2 years of professional experience in marketing and did not have a marketing-focused education. In addition, the applicant summaries contained a section titled "Optional Information Supplied by Applicant." This section included, among other things, information on the applicant's race, "White" or "Black (African American)," that was assigned after pretesting.
The pretest of the stimulus materials involved a sample of 24 undergraduate students who rated the qualifications of the 10 applicants based on descriptions that excluded race information. As expected, the group of the five qualified applicants was rated as more qualified than the group of the five other applicants, t(23) ϭ 4.85, p Յ .001. Three of the five more qualified applicants were randomly labeled as Blacks, whereas the remaining two more qualified applicants and the five less qualified applicants were labeled as Whites. More White candidates were included than Black ones in order to approximate the likely applicant pool for the position under consideration. In the pretest, the ratings of Black applicants did not differ from those of qualified White applicants, t(23) ϭ Ϫ.18, ns. Comparisons between groups of applicants were performed, as we were interested in the treatment of Blacks as a group.
Manipulation check. The questionnaire participants filled out after the experiment contained the following item: "How much freedom of choice do you feel you had to ignore an applicant's race in evaluating him or her for this position?" Participants responded to the item on a 31-point Likert Scale ranging from "Completely Free" (1) to "Not Free At All" (31).
Results
Manipulation Check
The results of a t test indicated that participants in the business-justification condition (M ϭ 21.48) felt significantly less freedom of choice regarding the use of race than did participants in the no-justification condition (M ϭ 5.72), t(82) ϭ 9.05, p Յ .001. (Note: Smaller numbers indicate higher freedom of choice.)
Main Analyses
Hierarchical multiple regression analysis (e.g., Cohen & Cohen, 1983 ) was used to test (a) that subordinates given a business justification to discriminate against Blacks do so (Hypothesis 1) and (b) that subordinates' modern racist attitudes affect discrimination against Black applicants in the presence of a business justification from a legitimate authority figure to do so, but not in the absence of such a justification (Hypothesis 2).
The MRS scores were entered on the first step using the number of Blacks selected as the dependent variable. This step yielded a nonsignificant R 2 of .00. Modern racism, as expected, did not have a main effect on the number of Blacks selected.
Justification condition was entered on the second step using a dummy variable that compared the no-justification to the business-justification condition (coded 0 and 1, respectively). As suggested by Hypothesis 1, this step yielded a R 2 change of .41, p Յ .001. The raw regression coefficient for the justification condition dummy variable, which represents the difference between the dependent variable means in the two experimental groups controlling for MRS, was significant, B ϭ Ϫ1.01, p Յ .001. Participants in the business-justification condition (M ϭ .83) selected fewer Black applicants than did participants in the no justification condition (M ϭ 1.84), t(82) ϭ 7.48, p Յ .001.
In the final step of the hierarchical multiple-regression analysis, the interaction between the variables from Steps 1 and 2 was tested by entering their product. In support of Hypothesis 2, this step yielded an R 2 change of .03, p Յ .05. Table 1 , in which participants were assigned to a high modern racism group or a low modern racism group on basis of a median split (Mdn ϭ 15.50), depicts the interaction, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. That is, in the business-justification condition, participants high on modern racism selected significantly fewer Black applicants (M ϭ .53) than did participants low on modern racism (M ϭ 1.10), t(38) ϭ 2.57, p Յ .05. In the no-justification condition, however, the number of Blacks selected did not differ for participants high on modern racism (M ϭ 1.87) and participants low on modern racism (M ϭ 1.81), t(42) ϭ Ϫ.41, ns, implying that modern racism was held in check in the absence of a justification for discrimination.
Discussion
In Study 1, as expected, (a) subordinates receiving a business justification from a legitimate authority figure to discriminate against Black job applicants tended to do so and (b) subordinates' prejudice predicted discrimination only in the presence of such a justification. Given the dependent variable in the study was the number of qualified Black applicants selected for interviews, the strength of these effects is apparent. For example, as indicated in Table  1 , while the number of Blacks selected in the no-justification condition essentially did not differ by level of prejudice, in the business justification condition, participants high on modern racism selected about half as many Blacks than did those low on modern racism.
In particular, the story line of the business justification-that homogenous work groups are more harmonious than racially mixed ones and that customers prefer dealing with company representatives of their own race-helps reveal the nature of institutionally based racial discrimination. Such story lines, which in the current case led even those low on modern racism to select almost one in three fewer Blacks to be interviewed, have a long tradition in American The business justification also interacted with modern racism such that it released modern racists to act on their prejudices against Black job applicants. This interaction finding is consistent with and extends McConahay's (1986) theory of modern racism, which states that, because modern racists view racism as bad, they need a plausible, nonprejudiced justification to protect their selfimage in order to behave in a discriminatory fashion. Extending modern racism theory, we found that the justifications modern racists require to act on their prejudices need not enhance the saliency and potency of nonracial factors. Instead, they can be race based, as was the story of the President in the experimental condition.
In the Study 1, the legitimacy of the authority figure supplying the business justification to discriminate was treated as a constant. But, as was argued earlier, such legitimacy can be thought of as a variable. Below, we examine the effects of this variable on discrimination.
STUDY 2
Study 2 was designed to test the following hypotheses: (1) subordinates given a business justification by a legitimate authority figure to discriminate against Black job applicants do so more than those receiving the same justification from an illegitimate authority figure, and (2) subordinates' modern racist attitudes affect discrimination against Black applicants in the presence of a business justification from a legitimate authority figure to discriminate, but not in the presence of such a justification from an illegitimate authority figure. Again, a main effect for modern racism was not predicted.
Moreover, Study 2 was designed to be a "constructive replication" (Lykken, 1968) of Study 1. That is, Study 2 was designed to test the hypotheses tested in Study 1 using, as described in detail below, a somewhat different business justification, participant population, task context, and operationalization of the dependent variable. The business justification in Study 2 stressed matching the potential hire to the current workforce rather than customers, the participants were advanced undergraduate students enrolled in business courses rather than students enrolled in an introductory psychology course, and the task was embedded in an in-basket rather than presented as part of a consulting project. The dependent variable was the evaluation rather than the selection of Black applicants.
Method
Participants
One hundred thirty-seven non-Black, advanced undergraduate students enrolled in business courses at a private university in the south-central United States volunteered to participate in the study in exchange for course credit. Forty-two percent were female, 35% were employed, and the mean age was 20.5 years.
Procedure
Stage 1: pretest. All students enrolled in the business courses used for this study participated in a mass testing procedure at the beginning of the semester. The students were informed that the questionnaires they would be completing were designed to investigate various factors, which could affect how managers make decisions. A measure of modern racism was included in this testing procedure. In addition, all participants completed a number of demographic items following the questionnaires.
Stage 2: the experiment. Four weeks later, participants were presented with an in-basket exercise that was described as a managerial decision making task. Participants were asked to play the role of Todd Folger, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of a hypothetical Mexican restaurant chain, JOSE'S. They read descriptions both of the firm and of their role as Todd Folger. Participants then were instructed to complete the in-basket exercise in their role as JOSE'S CFO. The in-basket required participants to make decisions regarding a variety of issues; for example, what salary to offer an incoming training and development manager and when to record a gain on the potential sale of property. For each in-basket decision, participants were provided with a number of suggested alternatives from which to choose; additional space for comments also was provided. In addition, they were required to make several hiring recommendations. Participants learned through memoranda in the in-basket that the VicePresident (VP) of Human Resources would be leaving and that, as the person to whom this VP reports, the CFO (the participant) would be involved in choosing her replacement. Included in the in-basket was a list of eight applicants reportedly prescreened by the JOSE'S Human Resources Department. This list included brief descriptions of each applicant. Participants were asked to rate each applicant in terms of his or her quality as a potential job candidate.
Participants were assigned randomly to one of three conditions: (1) legitimate authority figure providing a business justification to discriminate (legitimatesource condition, labeled in Study 1 as the "business-justification condition"), (2) illegitimate authority figure providing a business justification to discriminate (illegitimate-source condition), or (3) no instructions regarding race issued by a legitimate authority figure (no-justification condition). All manipulations were embedded in memoranda from the President and Chairman of the Board of JOSE'S.
Along with instructions from the President to take into account applicant education and experience when making hiring recommendations, participants in the legitimate-and illegitimate-source conditions read the following message that was adopted from Brief et al. (1995) :
Given that the vast majority of our work force is White, it is essential we put a White person in the VP position. I don't want to jeopardize the fine relationship we have with our people in the units. Betty [the outgoing Vice President] worked long and hard to get those folks to trust us; and I do not want her replacement to have to overcome any personal barriers.
Participants in the no-justification condition received no instructions from the President concerning race. They merely were told to attend to applicants' education and relevant work experience.
Legitimacy of the source was manipulated in a separate memorandum from the Chairman of the Board of Directors, which appeared in the in-basket after the hiring instructions from the President. Participants in the illegitimatesource condition read the following message:
I am very sad to have to inform you that, due to recent evidence revealing a very long history of improprieties, John Cummings will be relieved of his duties as President, effective immediately. Due to legal constraints and an ongoing investigation, I am unable at this time to release many details regarding John's removal. In order to quell the inevitable rumors, I will tell you that the investigation centers around John's illegal trading of JOSE'S stock he owned, and importantly, there is no evidence that any other members of JOSE'S management were involved in illegal activity. From this day forward, until a new President is chosen, all employees responsible to John will report directly to me. Given John's recent state of mind, you may want to question any recent directives or decisions handed down by him. Your support during this trying time is much appreciated.
Participants in the legitimate-source condition and the no-justification condition received no memorandum regarding John Cummings' improprieties.
Following the in-basket, participants completed a number of manipulation check items. Upon completion of all materials, participants were debriefed.
Measures
Modern racism. As in Study 1, the Modern Racism Scale was used to assess participants' levels of prejudice. In the current sample, coefficient alpha was .83, the mean was 16.58 (SD ϭ 5.77), and the median was 16, with scores ranging from 7 to 35.
Dependent measure. Participants were asked to rate the eight applicants in terms of their quality, based on the applicant descriptions provided. Each applicant's description was followed by a scale on which participants rated the applicant from 1 ("Excellent Referral") to 5 ("Should Not Have Been Referred"). Ratings of three qualified Black applicants were averaged for each participant to create a measure of discriminatory behavior and, for the sake of interpretation, reverse scored, such that higher scores indicated more favorable evaluations.
The eight applicant descriptions, taken from Brief et al. (1995) , included jobrelevant information on education and work experience. A priori, the qualifications, as described below, were manipulated to be higher for six of the applicants than for the remaining two applicants. The six qualified applicants had work experience in the restaurant industry and master's degrees, whereas the two unqualified applicants did not have experience in the restaurant industry and held bachelor's degrees. In addition, the descriptions contained a section entitled "Additional Information." This section included job-irrelevant information such as nonwork activities (e.g., photography and sailing); gender; and the applicant's race, "White" or "Black (African American)," which was assigned after pretesting.
The pretest of the stimulus materials involved an independent sample of 52 MBA students who rated the qualifications of the eight applicants based on descriptions that excluded race information. As expected, the group of the six qualified applicants was rated as more qualified than the group of the remaining two applicants, t(50) ϭ 22.15, p Յ .001. Three of the six more qualified applicants were randomly labeled as Blacks and the remaining three more qualified applicants and the two less qualified applicants as Whites. In the pretest, ratings of Black applicants did not differ from those of qualified White applicants, t(50) ϭ Ϫ.18, ns (incidentally, this t value was identical to the corresponding t value of Study 1). Applicant gender was distributed such that one each of the Black candidates, the qualified White applicants, and the unqualified White applicants was female.
Manipulation checks. In order to determine whether participants understood the instructions to use race as a selection criterion, they were asked to recall the stated hiring preferences of JOSE'S President. Specifically, participants were asked whether the President preferred to hire White applicants, African American applicants, Latino applicants, or had no preference with regard to race. As a check on the source legitimacy manipulation, participants completed an 10-item scale. Participants were required to rate their agreement with items such as the reverse scored item "During the exercise, I felt, in my role as Todd Folger, that John Cummings' legitimate authority declined." Agreement was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 ("Strongly disagree") to 7 ("Strongly agree"). The coefficient alpha for this scale was .87.
Results
Manipulation Checks
Ninety-five percent of the participants correctly recalled the racial hiring preferences stated by the President in their experimental condition. A oneway analysis of variance on ratings of the legitimacy of the President with condition as the independent variable revealed a significant effect for condition, F(2, 133) ϭ 48.16, p Յ .001. A priori planned comparisons revealed that participants in the illegitimate-source condition (M ϭ 30.21) viewed the President as less legitimate than participants in both the legitimate-source condition (M ϭ 42.07), t(90) ϭ 6.70, p Յ .001, and the no justification condition (M ϭ 46.75), t(90) ϭ 9.65, p Յ .001.
Main Analyses
As in Study 1, hierarchical multiple-regression analysis was used to test (a) Hypothesis 1, that participants comply more with a business justification to discriminate from a legitimate authority figure than with such a justification from an illegitimate authority figure and (b) Hypothesis 2, that subordinates' modern racist attitudes affect discrimination against Black applicants in the presence of a business justification from a legitimate authority figure to do so, but not in the presence of such a justification from an illegitimate authority figure. Moreover, the regression analyses were performed such that they also allowed to potentially replicate the findings of Study 1, which compared a legitimate-source condition to a no-justification condition.
Prior to the regression analyses, two condition dummy variables had to be formed because the condition had three levels (e.g., Cohen & Cohen, 1983) . For the first dummy variable, the illegitimate-source condition was coded 1 and the two other conditions were coded 0. For the second dummy variable, the no-justification condition was coded 1 and the other two conditions were coded 0. Moreover, two interaction terms had to be formed as the products of the first dummy variable and MRS (modern racism scale) scores and the second dummy variable and MRS scores (e.g., Aiken & West, 1991) . We employed dummy coding (Cohen & Cohen, 1983, pp. 183-198) with the legitimate-source condition as the reference group because this coding allowed us, as intended and explained below, to compare the legitimate-source to the illegitimate-source condition as well as the legitimate-source to the no-justification condition. As described by Cohen and Cohen (1983, p. 193) , the raw regression coefficients for dummy variables represent comparisons of the groups coded 1 on the relevant dummy variables (i.e., the illegitimate-source condition for the first dummy variable and the no-justification condition for the second dummy variable) to a reference group (i.e., the legitimate-source condition). More precisely, these raw regression coefficients represent the difference in the dependent variable means (i.e., the average rating of Black applicants) between the group coded 1 on the relevant dummy variable and the reference group. Moreover, the two interaction terms allowed for testing the two interactions of interest (i.e., the Illegitimate-Source/Legitimate-Source ϫ MRS interaction and the No Justification/Legitimate-Source ϫ MRS interaction). More precisely, as described by Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990, p. 45 ), a raw regression coefficient for an interaction term involving a dummy variable and a continuous variable indicates the difference between the continuous variable/dependent variable slope in the group coded 1 on the dummy variable and the continuous variable/ dependent variable slope in the reference group.
In
Step 1, the average rating of the three Black applicants was regressed on MRS scores. As expected, this step yielded a nonsignificant R 2 of .02. Modern racism did not have a main effect on the ratings of Black applicants.
Step 2, the two above described dummy variables representing the three levels of the independent variable condition were entered. Entering these dummy variables produced a change in R 2 of .11, p Յ .001, indicating a main effect for condition. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the raw regression coefficient for the dummy variable formed to compare the illegitimate-source condition to the legitimate-source condition was significant, B ϭ .52, p Յ .001. The average rating of Black applicants was significantly more favorable in the 88 BRIEF ET AL.
illegitimate-source condition (M ϭ 4.31) than in the legitimate-source condition (M ϭ 3.80), t(88) ϭ Ϫ3.76, p Յ .001. Moreover, replicating the main effect from Study 1, the raw regression coefficient for the dummy variable formed to compare the no-justification condition to the legitimate-source condition was significant, B ϭ .32, p Յ .05. Black applicants were more favorably evaluated in the no-justification condition (M ϭ 4.13) than in the legitimate-source condition (M ϭ 3.80), t(86) ϭ Ϫ2.44, p Յ .05. A significant difference in the average rating of Black applicants between the illegitimate-source condition and the no-justification condition was not detected, t(90) ϭ Ϫ1.50, ns.
Step 3, the two interaction terms were entered. Entering both dummy interaction variables produced a change in R 2 of .03, p Յ .10, that approached significance (see, for example, Aguinis & Stone-Romero, 1997, for a discussion of the difficulty of detecting interactions). Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the raw regression weight for the Illegitimate-Source/Legitimate-Source ϫ MRS interaction was not significant, B ϭ .21, ns. However, replicating the interaction of Study 1, the raw regression weight for the No-Justification/Legitimate-Source ϫ MRS interaction was significant, B ϭ .36, p Յ .05. Table 2 , in which participants were assigned to a high-modern-racism group or a low-modern-racism group on basis of a median split (Mdn ϭ 16.00), depicts the significant interaction finding. As in Study 1, in the business justification condition, participants high on modern racism evaluated Black applicants significantly less favorably (M ϭ 3.54) than did participants low on modern racism (M ϭ 4.00), t(41) ϭ 2.28, p Յ .05. In the no-justification condition, however, the average rating of Black applicants did not differ for participants high on modern racism (M ϭ 4.15) and participants low on modern racism (M ϭ 4.11), t(43) ϭ .23, ns, implying that modern racism was held in check in the absence of a justification for discrimination.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 constructively replicate those of Study 1. Participants complied with a business justification from a legitimate authority figure to discriminate against Black job applicants, and this justification appeared to release modern racists to act on their prejudices. Moreover, the current findings make a contribution to the obedience-toauthority literature (e.g., Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Milgram, 1974) by demonstrating the importance of source legitimacy. That is, participants appeared not to obey to an illegitimate authority figure. Indeed, obedience to business justifications from an illegitimate source was so low that it did not significantly differ from that found in absence of a business justification (in fact, as discussed in the next paragraph, participants low on modern racism appeared to disobey to instructions from an illegitimate authority). The lack of obedience in the illegitimate-source condition is consistent with our earlier reasoning that, because an illegitimate source lacks credibility, a justification emanating from it is equivalent to no justification at all. In addition, the strength of our illegitimacy manipulation, involving discrediting and removing the source, could be considered quite potent. Thus, further research may be needed to attend to alternate operationalizations of illegitimacy. For example, it might be interesting to know how employees react to instructions from an ex-superior who is now in another position with the same organization or from a superior who used to be a samelevel colleague.
Support for an Illegitimate-Source/Legitimate-Source ϫ MRS interaction, however, was not found. Post hoc, it seems that this null result might be attributable to the reaction of participants low on modern racism in the illegitimate-source condition. We had expected-as found in the no-justification condition, but not in the-legitimate-source condition-no difference in reactions between participants low and high on modern racism in the illegitimate-source condition. In fact, however, in the illegitimate-source condition, the evaluations of Black job applicants by participants low on modern racism (M ϭ 4.50) were significantly more favorable than were those by their high-modern-racist counterparts (M ϭ 4.12), t(45) ϭ 2.25, p Յ .05. Thus, the pattern of results within both the legitimate-and illegitimate-source conditions was the same, ruling out the expected interaction. It may be that the reactions of the participants low on modern racism in the illegitimate-source condition were attributable to a "boomerang effect" in response to a message from a noncredible source. Further, post hoc analyses showed that, indeed, low modern racist participants' evaluations of Black job applicants were significantly more favorable in the illegitimate-source condition than in the no-justification condition (M ϭ 4.50 vs M ϭ 4.11), t(45) ϭ Ϫ2.83, p Յ .01, whereas participants high on modern racism evaluated Black job applicants highly similar in the illegitimate-source and no-justification conditions (M ϭ 4.12 vs M ϭ 4.15), t(43) ϭ .15, ns. These results indicate that in the illegitimate-source condition, as in the no-justification condition, participants high on modern racism were not released to act on their negative racial attitudes; but participants low on modern racism, in the illegitimate-source condition, appeared to have acted in a direction opposite to the justification provided to them. They might have been motivated to express vigorously their egalitarian values after receiving a message inconsistent with their racial attitudes from a discredited, illegitimate authority. Of course, future research is required to assess this possibility. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Pioneering research, such as Quinn et al.'s (1968) study of anti-Semitism in executive selection, laid the foundation for our research. However, whereas Quinn et al. observed a direct effect of prejudice on discrimination, we did not. That is, in our research, as we expected, no direct effects of prejudice on discrimination were detected. In isolation, one might take these null results and infer prejudice no longer is problematic in the workplace. But, theoretically, the story we have told and our findings very much contradict such a conclusion. Indeed, we suspect that Quinn et al.'s findings might not generalize to the contemporary workplace if the construct of interest were something called "modern" rather than "old-fashioned" anti-Semitism (but, see Korman, 1988 ). Instead we suspect, as is addressed in the following discussion of the limitations and implications of our research, that our findings regarding racial prejudice are germane to understanding new forms of prejudice targeted at a host of out-groups.
Theoretical Implications
As previously noted, our results provide strong support for McConahay's (1986) modern racism theory, according to which a modern racist sees racism as bad and, therefore, requires a justification to act on his/her negative racial attitudes. We selected modern racism to be representative of a number of constructs addressing subtle, new forms of racism thought to be evident in the United States (e.g., "symbolic racism"; Sears, 1988) . Interestingly, constructs pertaining to subtle forms of prejudice not only have been identified in the United States, but also in Western Europe, as noted by Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) . For example, in Britain, they referred to "the new racism," in France to "a new under-the-skin racism," in Germany to "latent prejudice," and in the Netherlands to "everyday racism." Moreover, Swim et al. (1995) found that modern prejudice does not only encompass prejudice against racial and ethnic minorities, but also women. Although the degree to which our findings about modern racism pertain to these and other subtle forms of prejudice remains largely unknown, we, as noted earlier, suspect that our findings are germane to understanding the effects of other kinds of modern prejudice in organizations. These suspicions are supported by Dietz and Petersen (1999) , who found, in a German study of employment discrimination, that only participants subtly prejudiced against immigrants from European Mediterranean countries selected fewer foreign job applicants when advised to maintain a homogenous workforce.
Not only did our results provide support for modern racism theory; they extended it. In the past, justifications to release modern racists to act on their prejudice have been described as plausible, nonprejudiced, and even nonracial explanations (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1981) for what might be considered prejudiced behavior. In light of the current research employing explicitly racebased justifications, it now seems that the justifications the modern racist requires need not be nonracial or, in the eyes of some, even nonprejudiced. It may be the case that modern racists, compared to those who are not, interpret any given explanation for acting against Blacks more broadly in terms of whether it is plausibly nonprejudiced, even though the explanation is race based (see, for example, Devine et al., 1991) . For example, a faculty member is told by his chairperson that given Hernstein and Murray's (1994) conclusions regarding the relationship between race and intelligence (i.e., Blacks score significantly lower on measures of intelligence than do Whites), it is not wise to expend limited resources on targeted attempts to recruit qualified Black students. Modern racists might interpret this explanation as a plausible, nonprejudiced reason for not allocating resources specifically to recruit Blacks; alternately, if the faculty member is not a modern racist, he may see the explanation, at least, as a veiled form of racism. We do not know how our participants might have differentially interpreted the business justifications provided them. Thus, it seems, if we are to learn the limits on the sorts of explanations that release modern racism, research ought to attend to the interpretive frameworks of modern racists.
Independent of modern racism, there was a troublesome though predicted compliance effect to instructions (i.e., business justifications) from above to discriminate. These compliance effects, coupled with those of Brief et al. (1995) , Dietz and Petersen (1999) , and Petersen and Dietz (in press ), demonstrate that the findings and reasoning of Milgram (1974) and other students of obedience to authority (e.g., Kelman & Hamilton, 1989 ) are relevant to understanding employment discrimination against minorities. Here too, the question of limits is important. For example, to what extent does the obedience effect extend to other workplace behaviors (e.g., to complying with instructions to engage in fraud)? And, under what conditions will a subordinate in a hierarchical relationship disobey the instructions of his/her superior? Even though the idea of organizational members as "free moral agents" is appealing, observers of organizations suggest those conditions are disappointingly few. For instance, Arendt (1963) has asserted "it is the nature of every bureaucracy . . . to make functionaries and mere cogs in the administrative machinery out of men . . ." (p. 289), and an employee "for the sake of his pension, his life insurance, the security of his wife and children [is] prepared to do literally anything" (Arendt, 1978, p. 133) . Consistently, Milgram (1974) , in part, attributed the findings of his obedience experiments to the participant acting as a "functionary who has been given a job to do" (p. 187). Brief, Buttram, and Dukerich (in press ) have theorized that so long as employees view instructions from above as pertaining to their "assigned roles" (Katz, 1964) in an organization, they likely will comply. For example, while a secretary may disobey an order from his boss to wash her car, he is likely to comply with instructions to tell callers the boss is not in when, in fact, she is there.
Practical Implications
The relative ease with which we were able to induce participants to discriminate and the realistic nature of the business justifications we used lead us to speculate that the Shoney's case represents just the tip of the iceberg. In fact, during the 1992-1993 fiscal year, employees filed more than 52,000 allegations of racial discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against private-sector employers (Brief & Hayes, 1997) . Our studies speak to more than the depth of the problem; they suggest strategies to be explored that might reduce discrimination against Blacks in the workplace. First, in light of the insidious nature of seemingly legitimate business justifications in our research, sensitizing authority figures to the potential effects of supposedly harmless (i.e., nonracist) statements (e.g., directives to consider how well job applicants might socially fit into their prospective work groups) should be examined. Subordinates harboring negative racial attitudes might interpret such statements as a justification for excluding Blacks, and, perhaps more importantly, such statements may produce discrimination independent of their recipients' racial attitudes. Second, it may be advisable to explore how the assigned roles of lower level organizational members might be redefined to include disobedience to instructions from above that are immoral and/or illegal. This suggestion could imply rewarding disobedience and punishing obedience in appropriate instances, which would entail a radical departure from how organizations now are managed (Jackall, 1988) . (For more on such suggestions, see, for example, Bandura, 1990; Brief et al., in press; Darley, 1992; and Hamilton & Sanders, 1992.) 
Limitations
In both studies, student participants assessed "paper" job candidates. While the external validity of studies relying on "paper people" has been questioned (e.g., Gorman, Clover, & Doherty, 1978) , we do not claim our findings are predictive of what will occur in a natural setting, but we do believe they are supportive of the theoretical explanations we advanced for how Black job candidates might be treated in the "real world" (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982) . The very sensitive nature of our research lent itself to a controlled setting. While Quinn et al. (1968) , for example, did openly pursue, in organizations, the problems of prejudice and discrimination, times have changed. Indeed, our article is built upon the idea that "old-fashioned" prejudices have been transformed into more subtle, rationalizable forms because being openly prejudiced no longer is morally, legally, or socially acceptable. Our reliance on a controlled setting, however, may not be overly troublesome. As Weick (1965) argued, although an organizational phenomenon may be studied in a laboratory, "it will retain its relevance to natural organizations if the experimental situation retains some properties of the setting, task, and participation associated with natural organizations" (p. 254). For example, Study 2 employed an inbasket exercise about which Bartol and Martin (1990) noted that "evidence exists that such exercises can realistically simulate the actual decision making environments of managers and . . . that managerial behaviors in simulated decisions parallel those ultimately exhibited on the job (Moses & Byham, 1977 )" (p. 602; see also Schippmann, Prien, & Katz, 1990 , and Thornton, 1992) .
Moreover, it could be claimed that the compliance effects observed in our studies are a result of "demand characteristics." According to Kruglanski (1975) , "the notion of demand characteristics asserts that a person's expectations or beliefs regarding certain events will mediate their influence on the person's behavior" (p. 116). He pointed out, however, that these cognitions may be essential to certain aspects of experimental variables. Indeed, the present studies were based upon the idea that participants will comply with instructions from a legitimate authority figure. The findings of our studies, therefore, are theoretically predicated on the induced expectations of participants concerning instructions from above, and these expectations are essential to the variable of interest and do not, as a result, constitute an experimental artifact.
In addition, we focused on the number of Blacks selected for interviews (Study 1) and the ratings of Black job applicants (Study 2) as dependent variables. One could, however, consistent with notions of in-group favoritism or bias (e.g., Brewer, 1996) , for example, have focused on the selection and ratings of Whites. But our focus was driven by a concern for those prejudicial behaviors at the core of modern racism theory (e.g., McConahay, 1986) ; that is, by a concern for African Americans as victims of discrimination. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in Study 1, the number of Whites selected was necessarily the reverse of the number of Blacks selected, and, in Study 2, post hoc analyses yielded no significant effects of experimental conditions and racial attitudes on the ratings of White applicants.
Finally, it should be noted that the measure of modern racism we used has not gone uncriticized (e.g., Dovidio & Fazio, 1992; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986) . The existing literature (including our own findings), however, support, to a large extent, that it is a valid, nonreactive indicator of racial prejudice (e.g., Lambert, Cronen, Chasten, & Lickel, 1996; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997) . This support helps explain why the measure has come to be used so widely in studies of modern prejudice (e.g., Devine, 1989; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Schnake & Ruscher, 1998; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1997) .
While not withstanding the above potential limitations, it is noteworthy that the main effects of business justifications to discriminate supplied by a legitimate authority figure and the interactions of those justifications and modern racism emerged across different experimental paradigms (experimental simulation versus in-basket exercise), dependent variables (choosing job candidates to be interviewed versus rating candidates), and participant populations (undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology class versus in advanced business courses), implying a certain degree of generalizability. In addition, the main effects of business justifications we observed mirror those Quinn et al. (1968) obtained in the field for organizational pressures to discriminate.
Summary
The results of our studies provide support for McConahay's (1986) theory of modern racism, the generalizability of Milgram's (1974) obedience to authority findings, and the role of source legitimacy in understanding obedience to authority in organizations. These findings have implications for better conceptualizing the limits on the justifications that serve to release to the beast of modern racism and on obedience to authority. Pragmatically, they suggest tactics that might help reduce employment discrimination. While we suspect that our findings are germane to other kinds of modern prejudice (i.e., to any kind of oldfashioned prejudice that has been transformed to a more subtle and rationalizable form), only future research can speak clearly to the "truth-value" of these suspicions.
